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Abstract 
 
This paper first points out the lack of consensus between empirical and theoretical studies of income inequality 
and redistribution. While theoretical papers show that income inequality increases redistribution, empirical 
studies fail to confirm the same result.  The paper later shows that even an exogenously given efficiency of 
redistributive institutions (ERI) affects the relationship between income inequality and redistribution.  This paper 
also introduces three specifications to endogenize ERI.  In these various specifications, increasing inequality 
reduces the ERI when (1) ERI is an increasing function of average income or (2) political influence on ERI is 
positively associated with income or (3) the median voter has some prospect of upward mobility.  There is one 
common element in these various specifications.  While income inequality increases the pressure for 
redistribution, it also increases the incentive to reduce the efficiency of redistribution in order to constrain 
aggregate redistribution.  Thus, the main conclusion is that one needs to consider these conflicting effects in 
order to account for the lack of strong empirical evidence of a positive relationship between income inequality 
and redistribution.    
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The Shadowing Role of Redistributive Institutions in the Relationship Between Income 
Inequality and Redistribution 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Italy has a more equal income distribution than the Dominican Republic.  However, 
Italy has redistributed 14 percent of its GDP for social security and welfare expenditure over 
the last thirty years, whereas the corresponding figure for Dominican Republic is only 0.8 
percent.   This observation is quite contrary the predictions of economic models.   Existing 
theoretical models suggest that higher income inequality generates more redistribution in 
favor of the poor.  While a positive relationship between income inequality and redistribution 
has been suggested much earlier (Meltzer and Richard 1981), with the advent of endogenous 
growth models1, a resurgence of interest in income inequality and redistribution took place in 
1990s.   The main purpose of the related endogenous growth papers was to explain the casual 
relationship between income distribution and growth.  In addition, these studies have also 
implications for income inequality and redistribution, given that redistribution typically 
emerges as the main channel from income inequality to growth.  The common theme in these 
political economy models is that higher income inequality leads to higher redistributive 
pressure and redistributive pressure affects growth.   
 Even though there exists a strong theoretical presumption in favor of a positive 
relationship between income inequality and redistribution, empirical studies fail to confirm 
this positive relationship (Benabou 1996, Perotti 1996, Milanovic 2000).   This lack of 
empirical evidence motivates this study to analyze income inequality and redistribution 
                                                 
1 See, for instance, Bertola (1993, 1998), Banarjee and Newman (1993), Saint-Paul and Verdier (1993), Perotti 
(1993), Perrson and Tabellini (1994), Galor and Zeira (1993), Alesina and Rodrik (1994), Aghion and Bolton 
(1997), Chiu (1998), Benabou (2000), Rigolini (2003). 
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relation by considering the efficiency of redistributive institutions (ERI).    Existing 
explanations2 for this failure overlook the role of ERI on the relationship between income 
inequality and redistribution.   
This study shows that inefficiency of redistributive institutions can limit the aggregate 
redistribution in the economy.  Furthermore, the current study provides a model where income 
inequality reduces the ERI while increasing the pressure for redistribution and thereby 
presents an explanation for the aforementioned empirical puzzle. 
This study also contributes to the literature by distinguishing two types of 
inefficiencies.  The first one occurs at the taxation stage.  Taxing income reduces agent’s 
incentive to supply effort or factors of production and hence generates deadweight losses.  
This case is the main form of inefficiency emphasized in existing studies like McGuire and 
Olson (1996) and Harms and Zink (2003).  This study draws attention to the second type of 
inefficiency, which has been overlooked so far in analyzing the income inequality and 
redistribution relationship.  This type of inefficiency emerges in the process of redistributing 
the tax revenue back to society.  Existing political economy models ignore the redistributive 
institutions in the redistribution process and simply assume that all tax revenues are 
redistributed back to society without any change in the total value.  However, in reality, 
governments play an active role in the redistribution process.  Hence, how governments run 
their redistributive institutions emerges as another form of inefficiency and needs to be taken 
into account. 
Anecdotal evidence from Latin America by De Ferranti et al.  (2004)3 also confirms 
our idea that income inequality reduces government effectiveness by generating political 
                                                 
2 See Harms and Zink (2003) for the detailed literature review. 
3 The World Bank Publication, “Inequality in Latin America Breaking with History?” provides an extensive 
analysis of the role of income inequality on governance and redistribution especially in chapter 5.   
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inequality, clientelism, and state capture by the elite.  Moreover, inefficiency in redistributive 
institutions in turn adversely affects aggregate redistribution, for instance in the Dominican 
Republic (Keefer 2002).   
The literature on inefficient redistribution is also related here.   The central issue in 
this literature is to explain why most redistribution in practice takes an inefficient form.   
Coate and Morris (1995) attribute inefficient transfers to imperfect information.  Politicians 
exploit the voters’ imperfect information to make transfers to their favorite groups.   
Acemoglu and Robinson (2001-a) assert that inefficient redistribution is employed in order to 
maintain future political power.   Drazen and Limao (2004) emphasize that inefficient 
transfers increase the bargaining power of the government.  Finally, the commitment to 
inefficient forms of redistribution emerges as a way to constrain redistribution (Becker and 
Mulligan 2003).   Similarly, in this current study, the inefficiency in redistributive institutions 
generates inefficient redistribution and thereby constrains the redistributive pressure of the 
poor.    
This paper is organized as follows.   Section 2 introduces the benchmark model.  
Section 3 analyzes a model where ERI is a positive function of average national income.   
Two stage specifications where the political power is proportional to income and the prospect 
of upward mobility hypothesis are investigated in Section 4.   Finally, Section 5 concludes.   
Detailed proofs, arguments for the political power of the wealthy, and some extensions are 
relegated to the Appendix.   
 
2. The Model 
 
In this section, we explain the model in two steps.   First, we take the ERI as 
exogenously given and show that ERI plays an important role in determining aggregate 
redistribution in the economy.   Next, we endogenize ERI in several ways.  First, we use the 
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assumption of Azariadis and Lahiri (2002) that ERI is a positive function of average income.   
In this specification, income inequality increases the prevailing tax rate in the economy.  
Then, the higher tax rate reduces the average income due to the disincentive effect of taxation, 
and the decline in average income reduces ERI.  This section shows that income inequality 
determines not only the equilibrium tax rate but also the ERI. 
Other explanations of how income inequality can influence the ERI rely on a common 
assumption that ERI are determined prior to the effective tax rate in the economy.  We 
emphasize the same theme across various alternatives.   The common element in these 
alternative explanations is that the decisive voter in determining ERI is wealthier or expects to 
be wealthier than the median voter who chooses the tax rate in the second stage.   Moreover, 
all these explanations share a common motivation: since the wealthy disproportionately bear 
the burden of taxation, they have incentives to constrain redistribution by reducing the 
benefits of redistribution for the poor.   
Among these various mechanisms, we first follow Benabou (1996 and 2000) in the 
first stage, we deviate from standard median voter hypothesis and analyze the possibility that 
the political power in determining the ERI is proportional to income.   When political 
influence in changing institutions is proportional to income, the wealthy become more 
powerful in designing the redistributive institutions.  Since the wealthy disproportionately 
bear the burden of redistributive income tax in the second stage, they attempt to manipulate 
the redistributive institutions in the first stage in order to constrain the redistributive taxation 
in the second stage. 
In other explanations, we do not deviate from the median voter hypothesis but we 
introduce uncertainty about individual’s future income.  Due to this uncertainty, even though 
the aggregate income distribution does not change over time, the median voter in the first 
stage becomes willing to set up a lower ERI.  The median voter in the first stage expects to be 
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wealthier in the second stage.  Since income distribution stays the same, the median voter of 
the first stage actually expects not to be the median voter in the second stage.  Hence, he/she 
manipulates ERI in his/her self-interest when he/she has the power in the first stage.   
The results here are also established without deviating from median voter hypothesis.   
The prospect of upward mobility (POUM) offers an alternative.    In the POUM hypothesis, 
when individuals’ expected future income is a concave function of their current income, the 
current median voter expects to be wealthier than the future median voter and hence attempts 
to reduce ERI to constrain future redistribution.   
In all of these different explanations, income inequality also increases the incentive to 
reduce ERI in order to constrain the redistributive pressure that rises with income inequality.  
In the model, while higher income inequality increases the redistributive pressure, it also 
increases the incentive of the decisive voter to reduce the ERI.   Therefore, the final effect of 
income inequality on redistribution depends on the relative magnitude of these two opposite 
effects.   
 
2.1. The Benchmark Model 
 
The economy is populated by a large number of individuals.  Population size is 
normalized to one.   All individuals have identical preferences, and they obtain utility only 
from their own consumption.  The utility function of individual i  is given by 
 
)()()1( TyTTyTU ii α+−=  (1) 
 
where 10 ≤≤T  and 0>α  denote the income tax rate and ERI respectively.  Each individual 
is assumed to be endowed with a different skill level.   When individuals work, they receive 
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income, iy  proportional to their skill before taxation.   The individuals pay a flat tax rate T  
and receive )(TyTα  from redistribution. 
In terms of notation, )(Tyi  differs from iy  and indicates the post tax level of income 
of individual i .  The model incorporates the disincentive effect of taxation as a decline in 
individual income4.  In the model, this disincentive effect of taxation for individual i  is 
characterized as 
0)( ≤∂
∂
T
Tyi   (2) 
  
Following Benabou (2000), we adopt the following functional relationship between 
tax rates and income to account for the disincentive effect of taxation. 
bT
ii eyTy
−=)(  (3) 
 
Equation 3 indicates that with the introduction of taxation, each individual’s income 
changes in proportion to bTe− where ]1,0[∈b  represents the extent of the disincentive effect in 
the model5.   
                                                 
4 The disincentive effect of taxation is already widely accepted in the literature. Therefore, in the model, we do 
not attempt to endogenize this assumption. However, without going into the details, one can think of the most 
apparent reason why the higher tax rate reduces the taxable income in the economy. People will have less 
incentive to work if they know that some of their earnings are going to be taxed away anyway. Hence, they will 
substitute working with leisure and their post tax income, which is )(Tyi  will be less than their income before 
taxation, which is iy  [Meltzer and Richard (1981)]. One can also think of alternative explanations such as in 
Perrson and Tabellini (1994)’s model of the distortionary effects of taxation on capital accumulation. 
5The restriction which is  1≤b  is required to find an interior solution for ]1,0[∈∗T . Note that when 0=b  
there is no disincentive effect and when 1=b  the disincentive effect reaches its highest level in the model. 
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Since our main objective is not to explore the adverse effects of taxation on 
individuals’ income, we do not attempt to endogenize disincentive effect in the model.  
Actually, this issue has been already explored by the previous studies as labor-leisure trade off 
by Meltzer and Richard (1981) and consumption-capital accumulation trade off by Perrson 
and Tabellini (1994).  In this study, we prefer to be more general in defining the disincentive 
effects of taxation in order to incorporate these various reasons for disincentive effect of 
taxation.  Hence, our formulation of disincentive effect, for example, implicitly incorporates 
labor-leisure trade off in the following manner.  Increase in taxation reduces benefit of 
working due to decline in net income and subsequently reduces the utility of an individual.  
On the other hand, increasing leisure due to working less increases the utility of the 
individual.  However, as a final outcome, adverse effect of working less and making less 
income dominates the positive effect of increasing labor. Moreover, the disincentive effect of 
taxation has to be in the model.  Otherwise, the median voter always chooses an equilibrium 
tax rate of one as long as he/she has lower than mean income (Harms and Zink, 2003).   
Similarly, y  and )(Ty  denote the average income of the economy before and after 
taxation respectively.  Average post-tax income also changes in proportion to bTe−  and can be 
written as 
∫
=
−− ==
1
0
)(
i
bTbT
i eydieyTy  (4) 
 
A higher tax rate reduces the tax base, )(Ty  in the economy.  Average income in the 
economy without taxation is denoted as y  and represents the aggregate tax base.   
In Equation 1, each individual's income is taxed at the same rate T .  Aggregate tax revenue is 
then redistributed back to the society equally.  Since the tax burden is proportional to income 
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but redistribution is the same for each individual, the wealthy disproportionately bear the 
burden of taxation while the poor benefit from this taxation and redistribution process.   
Unlike the existing literature, redistribution in equation 1, )(TyTR α=  also depends 
on the efficiency of redistributive institutions, which is characterized by the parameter α .  
Hence, Equation 1 incorporates two types of inefficiency from the taxation and redistribution 
process.  The first occurs in the taxation stage, as a positive tax rate generates inefficiency by 
creating a disincentive to work.  The reduction in α  emerges as a second type of inefficiency 
that occurs during the process of redistribution.  In the current model, we first want to 
distinguish these two types of inefficiencies in taxation and redistribution stages, and secondly 
we want to show that inefficiencies in the redistribution stage, represented as a reduction in 
α , also play a role in constraining aggregate redistribution6. 
One can think of the following example to motivate variations in the parameterα .   
Suppose that to redistribute tax revenues, a government establishes a social security and 
welfare administration.   This branch of government hires new employees to run the 
redistributive programs.   But due to lack of competency of civil servants or due to corruption, 
suppose the social security and welfare administration wastes some of the government 
revenue in redistributing it back to the society.   For instance, suppose that the program 
constructs a new building to carry out redistribution to the needy, but pays more than 
necessary for the construction of the building due to their incompetence or corruption.   This 
represents a decline in α  because the needy only benefit as much as the real value of the 
                                                 
6 Existing political economy models ignore efficiency of redistributive institutions and assume that all the tax 
revenue is redistributed back to society. Therefore, they analyze the special case of equation (1) when α is equal 
to one. However, we only require 0>α . When 1>α , there are economies of scale or positive externalities in 
redistribution. For example, one can think of health care expenditure for the poor as a form of redistribution. 
There can be gains from providing health care facilities at the aggregate level, and hence α can exceed one.  
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building.   The ERI also declines when government officers receive their salaries without 
generating a corresponding benefit to the recipients of redistribution.   Actually, the parameter 
α  can be very broadly considered to capture various forms of inefficiencies in redistribution 
stage.   
 We first assume that individuals take α  as given and then they aim to maximize their 
utility with respect to tax rates.  Each individual has a preferred tax rate, depending on their 
level of income.  Then, the question is who determines the equilibrium tax rate in the 
economy.  In the model here, the median voter is assumed to have decisive power in 
determining equilibrium tax rate.  Hence, the median voter maximizes Equation 1 with respect 
to T  by setting 
0)()()()1()( =∂
∂++−−∂
∂=∂
∂
T
TyTTyTyT
T
Ty
T
U
m
mm αα  
where   
)()()( Tbyeby
T
ey
T
Ty
m
bT
m
bT
mm −=−=∂
∂=∂
∂ −−  
and  
)()()( Tybeyb
T
ey
T
Ty bTbT −=−=∂
∂=∂
∂ −−  
and finds his/her preferred tax rate as 
byy
T
m
1
1
1 +−=
∗
α   (5)  where 10 ≤≤ b  
 
One may also notice that the equilibrium tax rate decided by the median voter depends 
on the aforementioned two types of inefficiency.  First, when the disincentive effect of 
taxation is high, the median voter reduces his or her preferred tax rate, as 012 ≤−=∂
∂ ∗
bb
T .  
Second, ERI affects the equilibrium tax rate.  Whether ∗T  has an interior solution in ]1,0[  
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depends on α  and b .  The condition  
b
yyb m −≤≤+ 1
11 α   is enough to obtain an interior 
solution for ]1,0[∈∗T .  When b is low and/or α  is high, there is a corner solution at 1=∗T .  
In this case, the disincentive effect is not big enough to deter radical redistribution and/or 
efficiency of redistribution is so high that the median voter benefits from radical 
redistribution.   
The income inequality in this study is defined as the ratio of mean income to median 
income.  Definitely, this definition has its limitations.  However, it is the most common 
measure of income inequality in existing income inequality and redistribution studies.  For 
example, pioneering work of Meltzer and Richard (1981) uses this definition for income 
inequality.  Other influential papers in this topic such as Saint-Paul and Verdier (1993), 
Perrson and Tabellini (1994) Benabou (2000) also follow Meltzer and Richard in their 
definitions of income inequality.  In spite of this common use of income inequality measure, 
one may define the income inequality in different ways.  Hence, in discussing the definition of 
income inequality, Ray (1998) points out that “it is difficult to have complete unanimity in 
this subject” (p. 174).  However, mean to median income ratio satisfy at least three of the four 
common assumptions which need to be satisfied in constructing Kuznet’s curve.  Our 
definition of income inequality always satisfies the unanimity, population and relative income 
principles.  However, Dalton principle is not always satisfied.  For example, even though a 
regressive transfer worsens the income distribution, it may not change the mean and median 
incomes.  Given the widespread use of this definition, we decide to adopt the mean to median 
ratio as our measure of income inequality in the theoretical model.   
Now we can state a widely accepted conclusion of the political economy literature on 
the income inequality and redistribution relationship.   
 
Proposition 1: 
 11
Income inequality increases both the equilibrium tax rate and the aggregate level of redistribution 
)( ∗∗= TyTR α .  In other words: (i) 0
)(
>∂
∂ ∗
myy
T
 and (ii) 0
)(
>∂
∂
myy
R
. 
 
Proof: 
(i) 0
)(
>∂
∂ ∗
myy
T ; We only consider the case when we have an interior solution where 
]1,0[∈∗T .  In Equation 5, one can think of income inequality as the difference between mean 
income and median income.  When the median voter’s income is further away from the mean 
income, income inequality, myy  increases.  When we take the derivative of equilibrium tax 
rate with respect to income inequality, we find the following expression:  
0
)1()( 2
>−=∂
∂ ∗
mm yyyy
T
α
α .   Hence, income inequality increases the equilibrium tax rate 
QED. 
(ii) 0
)(
>∂
∂
myy
R ;  given that )( ∗∗= TyTR α , one may think that because of the 
disincentive effect, aggregate redistribution may not always increase with higher income 
inequality, while equilibrium tax rate increases.   In other words, ∗T  increases with 
myy while )(
∗Ty can be declining with higher ∗T .  So redistribution may even decline with 
higher income inequality or there might be some Laffer curve relation between income 
inequality and redistribution.  However, when  1≤b , the increase in ∗T  always dominates the 
decline in )( ∗Ty , and hence aggregate redistribution always increases with income inequality. 
This can be seen with the following expression 
0]1[
)(
)()(
)(
)(
)(
>−∂
∂=∂
∂
∂
∂+∂
∂=∂
∂ bT
yy
TTy
yy
T
T
TyT
yy
TTy
yy
R
mmmm
ααα  QED. 
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Now, we concentrate on how α affects the median voter’s preferred tax rate and 
aggregate redistribution for a given level of income inequality.  In this section, we do not 
attempt to endogenize α  but analyze the effect of exogenously given α  on ∗T , which has 
been ignored in the literature.  Then, our second proposition follows as 
 
Proposition 2: 
An increase in the efficiency of redistributive institutions, α , increases both the equilibrium tax rate  and the 
aggregate redistribution;  that is,  (i) 0≥∂
∂ ∗
α
T
 and (ii) 0≥∂
∂
α
R
. 
 
Proof: 
(i) 0≥∂
∂ ∗
α
T ;  when one takes the derivative of ∗T  with respect to α  in Equation 5, the 
following expression, which is always positive, is obtained: 
0
)1( 2
≥−=∂
∂ ∗
m
m
yy
yyT
αα .  QED. 
(ii) 0≥∂
∂
α
R ;  when one takes the derivative of )(TyTR α=  with respect to α , the following 
expression is obtained: 
)1(
)1(
)()()()()( 2 Tbyy
yyTyTTyT
T
TyTTyTTyTR
m
m −−+=∂
∂
∂
∂+∂
∂+=∂
∂
ααααααα  
This expression is always positive given that ]1,0[∈b  and ]1,0[∈∗T  QED. 
  
Both the equilibrium tax rate and aggregate redistribution decrease for lower values of 
α .  Therefore, one can conclude that ERI plays a role in limiting the amount of redistribution, 
and should be taken into account when considering relationship between inequality and 
redistribution.   
 13
One can think of the following example to see the hazard of ignoring the ERI in 
analyzing the income inequality and redistribution relationship.  Consider two countries with 
the same average tax rates and average incomes but different levels of income inequality.   If 
one ignores the possibility that α  may differ in these two countries, one would conclude that 
redistribution does not have a robust relationship with income inequality.  Suppose, however, 
α  is lower for the country with higher income inequality, let’s say for Country 1.  This 
difference implies lower aggregate redistribution for Country 1.  Although tax rates and 
average incomes are same in the two countries, Country 1 will have less aggregate 
redistribution due to lower values of α , which can be seen as 
2211 )()( RTyTTyTR =≤= ∗∗∗∗ αα  because 21 αα ≤ . 
This example carries important insights as to why existing literature cannot find a 
robust positive relationship between income inequality and average tax rates.  For example, 
Perotti (1996) attempts to test the implications of political economy models directly by 
regressing income inequality on average and marginal tax rates.   In this paper, the optimal tax 
rate emerges from Equation 5 as a function of the interaction term of α  and a measure of 
income inequality.   This interaction term is ignored to in existing econometric studies and 
thereby constitutes a potential reason for the failure to confirm the prediction that higher 
inequality should increase redistribution.   
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3. Income Inequality and ERI When ERI is a Positive Function of Average Income 
 
So far, the main purpose here has been to show that exogenously given efficiency of 
redistributive institutions plays a significant role in determining the equilibrium tax rate and 
aggregate redistribution.   In this section, we endogenize α  by following Azariadis and Lahiri 
(2002) and assuming that α  increases with average income7.   Under this assumption, income 
inequality determines both ∗T  and ∗α , simultaneously8.   Higher income inequality increases 
taxation and hence reduces average income due to the disincentive effect of taxation, and this 
reduction in average income also reduces ∗α . 
This assumption appears to be quite reasonable considering that higher income 
countries appear to have better governance in general.  Azariadis and Lahiri (2002) also draw 
attention to this issue.  They provide a model explaining why wealthy countries choose better 
governance.  In Azariadis’ and Lahiri’s model, high ability bureaucrats have to be paid a 
higher wage than their less able counterparts.  However, high ability bureaucrats generate 
better governance, which translates to a higher ∗α  in our context.  The wages paid to 
bureaucrats constitute the cost of government.  Azariadis and Lahiri show that as long as the 
cost of government rises less than proportionately with income, then as national income rises, 
government operations become less expensive and high income countries find better 
governance to be more affordable.     
With this assumption, one can see that income inequality has a direct positive effect on 
equilibrium tax rate. But the loop does not end there.  Since higher income inequality leads to 
                                                 
7 North (1981) also states that “as the scale of economic activity expands, better institutions become affordable, 
and hence government performance should improve” (p. 224). In addition, see La Porta et al. (1999).  
8 ∗T and ∗α denote the equilibrium tax rate and equilibrium efficiency of redistributive institutions prevailing in 
the economy. 
 15
higher ∗T  and higher ∗T  simultaneously reduces the average income due to a disincentive 
effect, one expects to see lower ∗α   in more unequal countries.  Under this framework, 
income inequality does not directly reduce ∗α  but does so indirectly by increasing taxes and 
simultaneously reducing average income in the economy.   
To model this idea, we assume that the disincentive effects holds as in the original 
model, hence bTii eyTy
−=)(  and bTeyTy −=)( .  We further assume that the functional 
relationship between )(Ty  and α  has the following form:  
bTeyaTyaTya −== )(),,(α  where 0>a  
In other words, we assume that  α  is an increasing function of the average income.  
First, the equilibrium tax rate must be found under this assumption.  Again the median voter 
maximizes his/her utility given in Equation 1 with respect to tax rate, impliying: 
 
0)()(
)(
)()()()1()( =∂
∂
∂
∂+∂
∂++∂
∂−+−=∂
∂ TTy
T
Ty
TyT
TyTTy
T
TyTTy
T
U m
m
m ααα  
and finds the equilibrium tax rate9 as 
)21(
1
m
m
yyb
yybT ∗
∗
∗
−
−+= α
α   (6) 
With this background, we can state our third proposition.   
 
Proposition 3: 
When efficiency of redistributive institutions is a positive function of average income, an increase in income 
inequality reduces equilibrium efficiency of redistributive institutions. 
 
Proof:  
                                                 
9 See the Appendix for derivations. 
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The equilibrium tax rate in Equation 6 depends on ∗α , and ∗α  in turn depends on ∗T .  
Hence, one needs to perform comparative static analysis in order to analyze the effects of 
income inequality on ∗T  and ∗α .  Moreover, given that ∗α is a function of y  and my , either 
y  or my  needs to be kept constant, while the other one changes in order to represent income 
inequality.   
 
1-When y  is Constant 
When y  remains constant, a decline in my  increases income inequality given that myy > .  
Hence, in order to show that income inequality increases ∗T  and reduces ∗α , we need to 
show that the following expressions hold: (i) 0≤∂
∂ ∗
my
T  and  (ii) 0≥∂
∂ ∗
my
α . 
The first order condition above can be rewritten as 
021),,,;,( =−++−−= ∗∗∗∗∗∗ mmm yybTyybTbyybaTF ααα  
Using 
∗
∗
∂
∂
∂
∂
−=∂
∂
T
F
y
F
y
T m
m
, we show in the appendix that  
0
]2)21[(
)21(
2
2
≤++−
+−
=∂
∂
∗∗∗
∗
∗
mmm
m
m yybyyyyb
b
y
y
y
T
ααα
α
  and  
0
]2)21[(
)21()(
2
2
2
≥++−
+
=∂
∂
∗∗∗
∗
∗
mmm
m
m yybyyyy
b
y
y
y ααα
αα . 
 
2-When my  is Constant 
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When my  is kept constant, an increase in y  increases income inequality, given that myy > .  
Hence, in order to show that income inequality increases ∗T  and reduces ∗α , we need to 
show that the following expressions hold: (i) 0≥∂
∂ ∗
y
T  and  (ii) 0≤∂
∂ ∗
my
α . 
Using 
∗
∗
∂
∂
∂
∂
−=∂
∂
T
F
y
F
y
T , we find in the Appendix that 
0
]2)21[(
)21(12
2 ≥++−
+
=∂
∂
∗∗∗
∗
∗
mmm
m
yybyyyyb
b
y
y
T
ααα
α
  and 
0
]2)21[(
)21(1)(2
2
2
≤++−
+−
=∂
∂
∗∗∗
∗
∗
mmm
m
yybyyyy
b
y
y ααα
αα . 
 
Proposition 3 has an interesting implication.  An increase in average income improves 
ERI unless the income distribution becomes more unequal.  This result suggests that growth at 
the expense of increasing inequality can indeed reduce the ERI due to the increasing 
redistributive pressure. 
 
4. Income Inequality and Efficiency of Redistributive Institutions in Two Stages 
 
 Considering that institutions are persistent, it seems reasonable to examine two-stage 
models in which redistributive institutions are determined prior to taxation.  Hence, the 
second type of explanations rely on the assumption that ∗α  is determined prior to ∗T .  A 
common element in this type of models is that the decisive voter in the first stage attempts to 
reduce ∗α  to constrain redistributive taxation in the second stage.   Under this alternative 
setting, we endogenize ∗α  in several ways.   
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 First, the wealthy may have more political power in the first stage than in the second 
stage.  We follow Benabou (1996 and 2000) in modeling this idea.  Political power is 
assumed to be proportional to income in the first stage, so that the wealthy have 
disproportionate influence over ∗α .  Since the tax rate will be decided by the median voter in 
the second stage, the decisive voter, being wealthier than the median voter, tends to reduce 
∗α  in order to constrain redistributive pressure in the second stage.   Hence, higher income 
inequality also implies higher political inequality, and leads to lower ERI.    
An alternative two-stage model relies on the uncertainty about an individual’s own 
income but complete certainty about the income distribution.  We show that income 
inequality can reduce ∗α  when the median voter’s expected future income is a concave 
function of his/her current income.  Benabou and Ok (2001) explain the lack of redistribution 
by referring to the median voter’s prospect of upward mobility (POUM).  In Benabou’s and 
Ok’s model, the only policy variable that affects redistribution is the tax rate.  Similar to their 
model, our model carries the same idea of POUM but with an alternative mechanism.  In our 
model, the POUM affects redistribution through influencing the determination of ∗α .  The 
median voter chooses a lower ∗α  due to his POUM in the second stage.  Moreover, income 
inequality again exaggerates the POUM effect and leads to further reduction in ∗α .   
Before exploring these various explanations in detail, we want to draw attention to a 
common motivation of these alternative explanations so that one will not be diverted in the 
remainder of this paper.  Then, the common underlying motivation in these various 
specifications can be stated as to constrain the future redistributive pressure that arises with 
income inequality.   
 
4.1. Institutional Equilibrium in Two Stages 
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Each individual has a preferred level of α  and T  depending on his/her income.  
Therefore, in each stage, individuals maximize their utility with respect to choice parameter of 
that stage.  It is quite reasonable to assume that ∗α  is determined prior to ∗T , given that it is 
harder to change institutions as compared to tax rates.  Since ∗α  is chosen in the first stage, 
the only choice variable left to the individuals in the second stage is the tax rate.  Moreover, in 
the second stage, we assume that median voter hypothesis holds.  Therefore, in the second 
stage, the median voter’s problem is exactly the same as before when α  is given 
exogenously.   
Determination of ∗α  is more interesting because the decisive voter in the first stage 
knows that his/her choice of α  in the first stage persists in the second stage and affects the 
median voter’s choice of ∗T .  Being aware of this influence, the decisive voter maximize 
his/her utility with respect to α , while considering the effects of his/her choice of α  on  ∗T .  
Hence, the decisive voter maximizes his/her utility given in Equation 110 with respect to  α :  
0)()()()()1()( =∂
∂
∂
∂++∂
∂+∂
∂−−∂
∂
∂
∂−=∂
∂
ααααααα
T
T
TyTTyTTyTTTyTT
T
TyU
d
dd  
and finds the following expression for ∗α  as 
)1)(1( −−= ∗
∗
∗
md yybTZ
Tα   (7) 
where  
2)1( m
m
yy
yyTZ αα −=∂
∂=  
byy
T
m
1
1
1 +−=
∗
α  
                                                 
10 The choice of ∗α  becomes enacted in the second stage. Hence, we can just concentrate on the individual’s 
utility function in the second stage. 
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Given that ∗T  and z  also contain ∗α  in their expression, Equation 7 denotes the 
implicit solution for ∗α .  The model becomes interesting when the decisive voter’s actual or 
expected income in the first stage differs from the median voter’s income.  Since it is certain 
that the median voter is decisive in the second stage, the only question is the actual or 
expected income of the decisive voter in the first stage.   
Next, we explore two scenarios in which the decisive voter’s expected or actual 
income may differ from the median income and show that income inequality exaggerates the 
motive to constrain taxation.  However, before explaining these models in detail, we introduce 
a log-normal income distribution to make our results analytically tractable.  We conjecture 
that the implications of the model would be valid for other types of income distributions. 
 
4.2. Log-Normal Distribution 
 
Let a continuum of agents ]1,0[∈i  have log-normally distributed income iy , so that 
)ln( iy  is normally distributed with mean 0≥μ  and variance 02 ≥σ , ),(log 2σμnyi ≈ or 
),()ln( 2σμNyi ≈ . 
The log-normal distribution of income is a good approximation for the empirical 
income distribution and will lead to analytically tractable results (Benabou and Ok, 2001).  
The log-normal distribution has also nice properties.  First, the log-normal distribution has a 
non-negative range  +∞≤≤ iy0 .  It also allows for an unambiguous definition of inequality 
as increases in 2σ  shifts the Lorenz curve outward.  This variance also measures the distance 
between median income and mean income.  The mean and median levels of a log-normal 
distribution are given by 
2
2
1σμ+
e and μe , respectively and thus  
2
2
1σ
e
y
y
m
= .   A mean 
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preserving spread in a log-normal distribution can be characterized when mey =  is kept 
constant and 
2
2
1σ−= mm ey is declining, due to increasing 2σ . 
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4.3. When Political Power on ERI is Proportional to Income 
 
When the efficiency of redistributive institutions is determined in the first stage, we 
model the political process by following Benabou (1996 and 2000) and analyze the case when 
political power is proportional to income.  Similar to Benabou (1996 and 2000), we do not 
seek to explain the source of wealth biases in political institutions but only to model them in a 
convenient manner11.  Therefore, the model explicitly formalizes departures from the one-
person, one-vote ideal. 
 Instead of assuming that the voter at the 50th percentile of the income distribution is 
decisive, let the agent located at the  thp  percentile be the decisive voter.  The most likely 
case is when 21≥p  and corresponds to a system biased against the poor due to, for instance, 
wealth restricted franchise or unequal lobbying power.  In the model, each agent has political 
weight in proportion to their income )( ii yw .  When an agent’s weight depends on the 
absolute level of his/her income, the pivotal voter corresponds to the income level dy  defined 
by  pyd =− ))ln(( 2σ
μφ , where φ  is the cumulative distribution function of a standard normal 
distribution.  Equivalently, one can define 2
1 )ln()( σ
μλφ −==− dyp   and write 2λσμ+= eyd .  A 
positive value of λ  corresponds to a positive wealth bias in the political institutions.  For 
example, the case 5.0=λ  corresponds to a one-dollar, one-vote rule. 
 Having identified the decisive voter in the second stage, we can now solve for the 
institutional equilibrium by putting the decisive voter’s income into Equation 7 as follows: 
                                                 
11 In the Appendix, we first put forward some arguments and examples for why the wealthy may have more 
political power. Then, we explain why the wealthy may not be able to reduce tax rate directly. 
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Combining, we have 
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Equation 7-1 implicitly defines ∗α  as a function of income inequality.  We simulate 
the model assuming an interior solution of ]1,0[∈∗T .  Based on simulation results, we can 
state our next proposition as 
 
Proposition 4: 
For positive values ofλ , higher income inequality makes the decisive voter in the first stage wealthier and 
reduces the equilibrium efficiency of redistributive institutions ∗α  
 
One can think of the following intuition to explain the simulation results.  The decisive 
voter in the first stage weighs the marginal cost and benefit of reducing ∗α .  The cost of 
reducing ∗α  comes from the redistribution side.  Since aggregate redistribution is divided 
equally among the whole population, by reducing ∗α  the decisive voter also reduces what 
he/she receives from redistribution.  The benefit of reducing ∗α  comes from the taxation side.  
Since the median voter in the second stage is now faced with a lower  ∗α , the benefit of 
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redistribution for the median voter declines and he/she tends to choose a lower tax rate by 
considering the disincentive effect of taxation.   
 In the simulation analysis below, an increase in income inequality is measured as a 
rise in 2σ .  We also perform simulations experimenting with various values of parameters in 
the model.   In all these various specifications, income inequality reduces the efficiency of 
redistributive institutions by increasing the gap between the decisive voter’s income and 
median income.  This result confirms our main idea that efficiency of redistributive 
institutions needs to be taken into account in analyzing income inequality and redistribution 
relationship. 
 25
 
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2 1.4
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
Figure-1 Income Inequality and ERI: 
When Political Influence on ERI is Proportional to Income b=.5, lamda=.5
σ; inequality
α; 
ef
fic
ie
nc
y
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2 1.4
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
σ; inequality
T
; 
ta
x 
ra
te
 
 26
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8
0.9
1
1.1
1.2
1.3
Figure-2 Income Inequality and ERI: 
When Political Influence on ERI is Proportional to Income b=.2, lamda=.1
σ; inequality
α; 
ef
fic
ie
nc
y
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
σ; inequality
T
; 
ta
x 
ra
te
 
 27
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
Figure-3 Income Inequality and ERI: 
When Political Influence on ERI is Proportional to Income b=.8, lamda=.5
σ; inequality
α; 
ef
fic
ie
nc
y
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
σ; inequality
T
; 
ta
x 
ra
te
 
 
4.4. When There is Uncertainty about an Individual’s Future Income and the Prospect 
of Upward Mobility   
 
The prospect of upward mobility hypothesis enables us to analyze the negative effect 
of income inequality on ERI without deviating from the median-voter hypothesis.  Benabou 
and Ok (2001) have shown that the POUM hypothesis is totally consistent with rational 
expectations under certain premises.  In order for the POUM effect to influence redistribution, 
the authors first require some degree of persistence in redistributive policies.   In our context, 
this implies that ∗α  chosen in the first stage will not be changed in the second stage.  In this 
regard, our model is an improvement on Benabou’s and Ok’s model to the extent that ERI are 
expected to be more persistent than a particular choice of tax rate.  Benabou’s and Ok’s 
second assumption requires that individuals are not too risk averse.  Since they also show that 
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for a moderate degree of risk aversion, POUM hypothesis still holds, we abstract from risk 
aversion and assume a linear utility function in Equation 1.   The third and key premise is that 
tomorrow’s expected income is an increasing and concave function of today’s income.     
 Concavity of the expected transition function that links today’s income to expected 
future income is a rather natural property of decreasing returns: as current income rises, the 
odds for future income improve, but at a decreasing rate.  Concave transition functions are 
common in economic models and econometric specifications.  Credit constraints and 
decreasing returns to capital accumulation, for instance, give rise to concave transition 
functions.  A log-linear AR(1) process of income dynamics, which is widely used in 
theoretical and empirical studies, has this concave transition property.   
In order to keep the aggregate income distribution constant while assuming concavity 
of expected income, Benabou and Ok (2001) add idiosyncratic shocks to the model.  
Idiosyncratic shocks play a role in offsetting the skewness-reducing effect of a concave 
expected transition functions so as to maintain a positively skewed distribution of income 
realization.  In contrast to concavity of the transition function, skewness of idiosyncratic 
shocks in itself does nothing to reduce the demand for redistribution.  In particular, it does not 
affect the distribution of expected incomes.  The balance between concavity of the transition 
function and skewness of idiosyncratic shocks leads to over-optimism of the poor about their 
income prospects.    
In our model, concavity of expected income with respect to current income leads the 
median voter of the first stage to expect to be wealthier than the median voter of the second 
stage while idiosyncratic shocks keep the aggregate income distribution to remain invariant.  
Hence, the tax rate chosen in the second stage will be greater than what is desired by the 
median voter of the first stage.  This result can be seen from Equation 5 
byEybyy
T
mm
1
)(1
11
1
1 +−≥+−=
∗
αα    because   mm yyE ≥)(  
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In the first stage, the median voter takes this effect into account and chooses a lower 
∗α  to reduce the tax rate that will be chosen by a future median voter.   
The more interesting question is whether this tendency of the median voter of the first stage to 
reduce ∗α  increases with income inequality.  The answer is affirmative.  Next, we follow 
Benabou and Ok (1998) to analyze the effects of income inequality on ∗α  under the POUM 
framework12.  First, we use a Markov process example to explore the effects of income 
inequality on ERI.  Then, we introduce a log-linear log-normal specification. 
 
                                                 
12In terms of motivations, there is similarity between the prospect for upward mobility hypothesis and 
constitutional context of Buchanan and Tullock (1962). We explain their relevance of Buchanan and Tullock’s 
idea to our model extensively in the Appendix. But, we state here that uncertainty about future income leads the 
decisive voter to expect to have mean income when deciding on ∗α  in the first stage (constitutional stage). 
Therefore, in Buchanan and Tullock’s context, even the median voter wants to reduce ∗α  with increasing 
inequality in order to constrain redistribution in the second stage. 
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4.4.1. Markovian Example 
 
 We want to find income processes in which stationary distributions are positively 
skewed, but where the median voter nonetheless chooses to reduce ERI in response to 
increasing inequality.  We can demonstrate this result through a simple Markovian example.  
We use the same Markov process that Benabou and Ok (2001) use in order to be compatible 
with earlier literature.  As an addition to their example, we introduce income inequality into 
the stochastic process by shifting income from the middle class to the wealthy and the poor.  
This is rather stylized characterization of income inequality, and follows existing studies that 
positively associate the income share of middle class with a more equal income distribution 
(Perotti 1996, Benabou 1996, Milanovic 2000).   
 Income takes one of three values: },{ 32,1 aaaX =   with  321 aaa << .  The transition 
probabilities between those states are independent across agents and given by the Markov 
matrix: 
⎥⎥
⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢⎢
⎢
⎣
⎡
−
−−
−
=
qq
spsps
rr
M
10
)1(1
01
 
where 4)1,0(),,,( ∈srqp . The unique probability vector π  that solves ππ =M  gives the 
invariant distribution induced by M over },{ 32,1 aaa  with mean 
3212211 )1( aaay ππππ −−++=  
 Benabou and Ok (2001) aim to show that the median voter’s expected income can 
exceed the mean income so that the median voter would be against redistribution.  They 
derive conditions on the mobility process and the associated steady state such that this is true.  
Our model does not require that the median voter’s income exceeds the mean income.  The 
key condition for these results to hold is that the median voter in the first stage expects to be 
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wealthier than the median voter of the second stage.  Thus, we can relax some of Benabou and 
Ok’s assumptions.  But, in order to be compatible with their example, we adopt their 
Markovian process.  For the detailed discussion of sufficient conditions on 
),,;,,,( 321 aaasrqp , one can refer to Benabou and Ok (1998).  When we modify their 
Markovian example and change income inequality, their conditions are always satisfied and 
the current median voter expects to be wealthier than the future median voter. 
 Benabou and Ok (2001, 1998) choose their specifications to match broad facts of the 
United States income distribution and intergenerational persistence.  Hence, they let 55.=p , 
6.=q , 5.=r  and 7.=s leading to the transition matrix: 
⎥⎥
⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢⎢
⎢
⎣
⎡
=
4.6.0
315.3.385.
05.5.
M  
and stationary distribution: )23,44,.33(.),,( 321 =πππ .  Thus, 77 percent of the population is 
always poorer than average.  They choose )91000,36000,16000(),( 32,1 =aaa  and obtain a 
rather good fit with the data.  This income process also has more persistence for lower and 
upper income groups than the middle class, which is consistent with the findings of Cooper, 
Durlauf, and Johnson (1998).  Given that our results primarily depend on the prospect of 
upward mobility for the median voter, note that this is rather nice characteristic in favor of our 
model.  In this example, the median voter expects to have $45,625 which is greater than the 
median income $36,000.   
 Income inequality is increased by spreading the income to the tails.  Thus, 1a  and 3a  
are each increased by an amount of d .  In order to keep the mean income constant, middle 
class income is reduced by d
11
14 .  The new income distribution then, is characterized as 
)91000,
11
1436000,16000(),( 32,1 dddaaa +−+= .  Note that when 0=d  the example is 
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exactly the same as that of Benabou and Ok (2001).  When 0>d existing income inequality is 
further exaggerated and middle class income evaporates for higher values of  d .   
One can also note that 
dad
dddyE
tm
11
143600032.45625
)91000(*315.)
11
1436000(*3.)16000(*385.)(
2
1
−=>+
=++−++=+
 
for all 6−>d .   
Thus, even as we increase income inequality by increasing myy , the median voter still 
expects to be wealthier than the future median voter.  The following simulation results for this 
specification show that this increase in income inequality, further reduces the equilibrium 
ERI.  This conclusion is our next proposition: 
 
Proposition 5: 
When individuals have some prospect of upward mobility, an increase in income inequality reduces the 
equilibrium efficiency of redistributive institutions ∗α . 
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4.4.2. Log-Linear, Log-Normal Specification 
 
Now, Let the transition function be log-linear: pyyf θθ =);(  for all values of 0≥y  
and with )1,0(∈p ensuring strict concavity in y .  The log-linear specification is very common 
in the empirical literature on income or wage dynamics over the life cycle or across 
generations.  Individual incomes thus evolve according to the stochastic process: 
11
lnlnln ++ += ttt iii ypy θ   
t , 1+t  are the first and second stages, respectively. 
Both the initial income levels and the shocks are assumed to be log-normally distributed.   
),(ln 2tti Ny t σμ≈  and ),2(ln 22 ssNti −≈θ  
Notice that )(
1+tiE θ  is normalized to 1 because 1)(
22
1
212 == +−+ ssi eE tθ .  Everybody 
faces the same uncertain environment.  In other words, the current income is the only 
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individual level state variable that helps predict future income.  With a log-linear specification 
of shocks, the cross-sectional distribution also remains log-normal over time and this is a 
good approximation to the actual income distribution.  Under this specification, the 
distribution of income has the following recursive equations for mean and variance: 
)(ln)(ln)(ln
11 ++ += ttt iii EypEyE θ   
which is equal to 
221 sp tt −=+ μμ  
and 
)var(ln)var(ln)var(ln
11
2
++ += ttt iii ypy θ  
or equivalently: 
2222
1 sp tt +=+ σσ . 
Note that tμ is the logarithm of median income )( tt eym μ= , whereas mean per capita 
income is given by 2
2
tteyt
σμ += . 
 
 
We analyze the case where the income distribution does not change over time, so that 
μμμ == +1tt  and 2122 σσσ == +tt .  From above equations, we obtain  2
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Given this specification, notice that 222
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 The next question is what is the income level expected by the median voter in the first 
stage.  The median voter’s expected income is equal to  
p
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p
m
p
mmmm ttttttt
yEyyEyfE === +++ )()());(( 111 θθθ  because 1)( 1 =+tmE θ . 
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The decisive voter again maximizes Equation 1 with respect to α  and finds a variant 
of Equation 7; 
12
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Note that the median voter maximizes his utility by considering his/her expected future 
income, inequality and median income of the second stage.   Simulation results below show 
that ∗α  declines with increasing inequality. 
1 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2 2.2 2.4 2.6
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
Figure-7 Income Inequality and Redistribution 
Log-Linear, Log-Normal Specification Prospect of Upward Mobility b=.5, p=.5
y/ym; inequality
α; 
ef
fic
ie
nc
y
1 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2 2.2 2.4 2.6
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
y/ym; inequality
T
; 
ta
x 
ra
te
 
 
 38
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
0
0.5
1
1.5
Figure-8 Income Inequality and Redistribution 
Log-Linear, Log-Normal Specification Prospect of Upward Mobility b=.5, p=.8
y/ym; inequality
α; 
ef
fic
ie
nc
y
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
y/ym; inequality
T
; 
ta
x 
ra
te
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
 This paper investigates the relationship between income inequality and redistribution 
by addressing the role of income inequality on redistributive institutions.  Existing literature 
analyzes the effects of income inequality on fiscal policy, sociopolitical instability and human 
capital13.  However, the effects of income inequality on institutions and in turn on 
redistribution have been overlooked so far in the existing studies.   
 We first take ERI as exogenously given and illustrate that ERI needs to be taken into 
account in analyzing the income inequality and redistribution relationship.  The model here 
shows that inefficiency in redistributive institutions reduces the incentive for redistribution 
                                                 
13 For detailed account of these explanations, see, for instance, Alesina, Ozler, Roubini, and Swagel (1996), 
Drazen (2000), and Perrson and Tabellini (2002). 
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that arises with income inequality.  Then, we address the question of how income inequality 
influences ERI.  We present a model with several specifications to analyze the effects of 
income inequality on redistributive institutions.  The results show that increasing inequality 
reduces the ERI (1) when ERI is a positive function of average income or (2) political 
influence on ERI is positively associated with income or (3) the median voter has some 
prospect of upward mobility.   The common element in these specifications is that income 
inequality not only increases the redistributive pressure and but also exaggerates the incentive 
to constrain the redistribution.  Hence, these two conflicting effects need to be considered in 
analyzing the income inequality and redistribution relationship.  Moreover, this approach can 
provide an explanation for the lack of strong empirical evidence in favor of a positive 
relationship between income inequality and redistribution, as implied by fiscal policy theories.  
This paper concludes that income inequality emerges as an important determinant of 
redistributive institutions and hence points out the need for exploring the income inequality 
issues from this perspective. 
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A.1. Derivation of tax rate when efficiency of redistributive institutions is a positive 
function of average income 
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A.2.Proof of Proposition 3 
 
The equilibrium tax rate in Equation 6 depends on ∗α  and ∗α , in turn, depends on ∗T .  
Hence, one needs to do a comparative analysis in order to analyze the effects of income 
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inequality on ∗T  and ∗α .  Moreover, given that ∗α is a function of y  and my , either y  or 
my  needs to be kept constant while the other one changes in order to represent income 
inequality.   
 
1-When y is Constant 
When y  is kept constant, a decline in my  increases income inequality given that myy >  .  
Hence, in order to show that income inequality increases ∗T  and reduces ∗α , we need to 
show that following expressions hold: (i) 0≤∂
∂ ∗
my
T  and  (ii) 0≥∂
∂ ∗
my
α . 
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Given that  ]1,0[∈b ,  ]1,0[∈T  and  0)21( 2 ≥− ∗ myyα ,  it is clear that 0≥∂
∂ ∗
my
α  QED. 
 
2-When my  is  Constant 
When my  is kept constant, an increase in y  increases income inequality, given that myy > .  
Hence, in order to show that income inequality increases ∗T  and reduces ∗α we need to show 
that following expressions hold: (i) 0≥∂
∂ ∗
y
T  and  (ii) 0≤∂
∂ ∗
y
α . 
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A. Appendices  
 
A.3. Why the Wealthy May Have More Political Power 
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Generally, political economy models of income inequality and redistribution assume 
equal political power for each individual, regardless of his/her income.  But, in practice, the 
belief that the wealthy minority, not the poor majority, controls the political process is 
widespread.  Our model takes unequal political power into account in determining the 
redistributive institutions.   
Our model is not the first in loosening the perfect democracy assumption.  Verdier and 
Ades (1992) deviate from perfect democracy assumption and analyze the case when only a 
fraction of population is enfranchised to vote.  They assume that belonging to the ruling class 
is costly.  Membership in ruling elite requires some fixed investment expenditure.  When 
capital markets are imperfect, mean preserving increase in inequality pushes a greater fraction 
of the population into a situation of political disenfranchisement, thereby concentrating 
political power on the wealthy.  One can find some historical evidence that voting franchises 
are restricted to citizens owning a minimum amount of property in Saint-Paul and Verdier 
(1993), Pearson and Tabellini (1994) and Jack and Lagunoff (2004);   for example, Jack and 
Lagunoff state: 
 
In the 19th century, England partially expanded along lines of wealth or property ownership as well.  
However, in Italy, the franchise was granted to citizens who passed certain educational as well as 
financial criteria in 1849.  19th century Prussia presents an interesting case: in 1849 voting rights were 
extended to most citizens, but these rights were accorded proportional to percentage of taxes paid.  The 
electorate was divided into three groups, each group given equal weight in the voting.  The wealthiest 
individuals who accounted for the first third of taxes paid accounted for 3.5 % of the population.  The 
next wealthiest group-the ‘middle class’-accounted for 10-12 % of population.  The rest of the 
population (about 85 %) accounted for the remaining third of the power. (2004 p.3) 
 
 
In our model, instead of assuming that there is a fixed cost for political participation, 
we follow Benabou (1996, 2000) in formulating the unequal political power in shaping the 
redistributive institutions.  Benabou (1996, 2000) attributes the political power of individuals 
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proportionally to their income.  Hence, higher income inequality also leads to greater 
inequality in the political arena.   
Having said that we adopt Benabou’s method in formulating political power, Prussian 
experience provides a valid historical example, revealing the political power of the wealthy.  
In our model, the taxation is proportional to income, and therefore the wealthy 
disproportionately bear the burden of taxation.  Similar to our model, in the Prussian 
experience, the wealthy, 3.5% of the population, pay more per capita than the other groups for 
taxation. But at the same time, their political power per person is also much higher than the 
citizens in other groups.   
One may have definite doubts in extending these historical episodes to the present, 
considering that it is rare to encounter with the cases that officially only the wealthy are 
enfranchised with certain political rights.  However, there is less contention for the idea that 
the wealthy have other means to express their political influence today, and most of the time, 
these means are very much proportional to income.  Similar to Benabou (1996, 2000), in this 
study, we do not attempt to model why the wealthy emerge to be more powerful to influence 
government’s decision.  Nonetheless one can think of several reasons.  For example, there is 
an extensive literature on how the wealthy can exert more political power in affecting 
government’s policies through lobbying activity, like in Estaban and Ray (2004), Bassett, 
Burkett and Putterman (1999).   
Another reason for greater political power of the wealthy can be related to the 
collective action problem originally formulated by Olson (1965).  For example, Rodriguez 
(2004) analyzes the political power of the wealthy in the context of income inequality and 
redistribution.  He shows that once the wealthy have lobbying power under uncertainty, 
standard positive relationship between income inequality and redistribution dissolves.  The 
most interesting aspect of his work is that Rodriguez incorporates collective action issues in 
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his analysis.  The wealthy are not just more powerful because of their income, but at the same 
time they are more immune to collective action problems.  Hence, they can form coalitions or 
lobbies much more easily than the poor.  Moreover, considering their number and greater 
interest at stake as factors reducing collective action problem, collective action issues emerge 
as another plausible reason for the wealthy to be more powerful in influencing redistributive 
institutions. 
 
A.4.Why the Wealthy do not Directly Reduce Tax Rate 
 
The question why the wealthy do not directly reduce the tax rate but attempt to 
exaggerate inefficiency in redistributive institutions is very much related to the literature on 
inefficient redistribution.  In the inefficient redistribution literature, the central issue is exactly 
the same that why redistribution takes inefficient forms even if more efficient alternatives 
exist.  In our model, reducing the tax rates is definitely better than reducing the efficiency of 
redistributive institutions, given that disincentive effect of taxation will be reduced in addition 
to not aggravating the inefficiency in redistributive institutions.  Then, why do the wealthy 
tend to reduce ERI instead of reducing tax rates directly? 
Asymmetric information and commitment problems constitute strong candidates for 
this behavior.   First, the wealthy prefer to play with ERI when people imperfectly observe 
identity of individuals in designing the ERI, but they are perfectly informed about the identity 
of the wealthy, when they attempt to reduce the tax rate.  For example, the wealthy may not 
dare to offer a cut in taxes channeled for social security spending for the poor directly.  
Instead they prefer to make the poor think that social security spending does not bring much 
benefit to them because of the low ERI.  Hence, by reducing ERI, the wealthy leave the 
decision to the poor to reduce the tax rate and redistribution.  As long as their attempts to 
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reduce ERI are observed with more imperfection than their attempts to reduce taxes, the 
wealthy prefer to manipulate ERI instead of trying to reduce tax rates.  Keefer and Khemani 
(2003) support this idea by stating  
 
It is especially difficult for voters to assess the quality and efficiency of service provision and to 
evaluate the responsibility of specific political actors for service breakdowns. (p.2) 
 
The second reason for this inefficient policy stems from the commitment problem.  It 
is not time consistent to set the equilibrium taxes at a lower rate in the first stage.  Even 
though in the first stage the wealthy and the poor agree to lower the tax rates, there is no 
guarantee that this agreement will last in the second stage.  In other words, there is no reason 
for the median voter to comply with any agreement to reduce tax rates in the second stage, 
once the ERI is already determined.    
There are definitely certain escape routes to overcome the commitment problem, 
especially when the game is repeated over time.  However, it is not easy at all to reverse 
institutions as a punishment strategy, considering the literature on the persistence of 
institutions (like in Acemoglu and Robinson 2001-a, Sokoloff and Engerman 2000).  In short, 
it is much more difficult to alter redistributive institutions in the future.  Therefore, in spite of 
the cost of increasing inefficiencies, the wealthy prefer to establish less efficient redistributive 
institutions to force the poor to commit to a lower aggregate redistribution scheme. 
 
 
 
 
A.5. Constitutional Context of Buchanan and Tullock 
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Buchanan and Tullock (1962) develop a theory of constitutional government.  Their 
constitutional stage closely resembles the first stage in our analysis in determining ∗α .  In 
their context, individuals are uncertain about their future positions and thus are led out of self-
interest to select rules that weigh the positions of all other individuals.   
Similar to their constitutional context, in our model, individuals in the first stage can 
be assumed to have information about the future income distribution with certainty but have 
no information about their own future income.  Individuals learn their income in the second 
stage.  Then, each individual in the first stage -constitutional stage- has an expected income 
equal to average income in the economy.  The existence of uncertainty about the individual’s 
own income ensures that unanimity is obtained in the first stage.  Hence, the decisive voter in 
the first stage expects to have average income, which is greater than the median income that 
will be realized in the second stage.  Again, due to the same reason that the decisive voter 
expecting mean income will not be the decisive voter in the second stage, each individual in 
the first stage agrees to set ∗α  lower than the median voter of the second period in order to 
constrain redistributive taxation desired by the future median voter.   Similar to the first 
explanation, income inequality aggravates the reduction in ∗α , while it increases the 
redistributive pressure. 
 The decisive voter’s expected income in the first period is equal to the mean 
income14 yyE d
?=)( .  Therefore, Equation 7 becomes 
)1)(1( −−= ∗
∗
∗
myybTZ
Tα    
                                                 
14 In order to convey the main message, we abstract from risk-aversion and assume linear utility function. The 
risk-aversion does not abruptly change the results as long as expected income sufficiently exceeds the median 
income in the second period. 
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Now, we can show how ∗α  changes with income inequality.  This change corresponds 
to the simulations above when  5.0=λ  because the decisive voter’s expected income 
becomes mean income when 5.0=λ  [ yeyE d == +
2
2
1
)(
σμ
].  Hence, one can also consider the 
above simulations when  5.0=λ  as an example in this case and note that  ∗α  declines with 
income inequality.   
 
Proposition A-1: 
Income inequality reduces the ERI when there is uncertainty about the individuals’ future income but has no 
uncertainty about the future distribution of aggregate income. 
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